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Abstract. We are on Mars again – the favourite laboratory for philosophical 
experiments. Our host colleagues introduce us to some Martian stuff referred to as 
“T”, and ask us to help them to identify T on other possible worlds. Or, technically 
speaking, we are asked to determine the intension of “T”, i.e., what the term 
designates with respect to different possible worlds. Following a short series of 
experiments on the planet, we conclude that the intension of “T” depends upon 
three factors: (1) The semantic rule linked with the term, i.e., the way in which the 
term is designed to pick out its referent with respect to different possible worlds 
(e.g., as a definite description, or as a proper name, or as an actualised description 
etc.); (2) The properties of the referent of “T” in the actual world; and, (3) What 
we shall call ‘the metaphysical background of the universe’, i.e., what counts as a 
thing vs. what counts as a property of things (e.g., whether the universe is such that 
it contains material objects that merely happen to have their manifest properties, or 
whether the universe primarily contains manifest objects that merely happen to 
have their material constitution). As our experiments show, changing the values of 
any of these variables will result in a change in the reference of the term with 
respect to different possible worlds, viz., it will result in a change in the intension 
of the term. We then demonstrate how the three variables are interrelated, and 
specify how exactly they combine to produce a particular intension of a term. We 
conclude with a general “formula” that determines what will deserve to be called 
“T” relative to the different values of the above variables, i.e., we come up with a 
calculator of intensions. Finally, we also draw some morals about rigidity.  
Keywords. Natural language semantics, identity and change, formal relations 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the modal aspect of terms, i.e., with the reference of terms 
relative to different ways the world might be. More technically, it is concerned with 
intensions. One common notion of intension is that the intension of a term is a function 
that assigns to each possible world the term’s extension relative to that world.1
(Although there are other notions of intension, our scope will be limited to this 
Carnapian notion.) For example, the intension of “the fourth planet from the Sun” 
assigns to each possible world, the planet which occupies the fourth place from the Sun 
in that world (if there is such a planet there), whether it is Mars or not; whereas the 
                                                          
1 There is by no means commitment here to intensions, thus defined, being a proper account of meaning. 
Ultimately, it is not: As is famously pointed out, “triangular” and “trilateral”, for example, although sharing 
the same intension, nonetheless clearly differ in meaning. Thus sameness in intension does not guarantee 
sameness in meaning; yet difference in intension does entail difference in meaning. However, intensions and 
meanings do bear an “almost” one-one correlation to one another (“almost” due to cases like the triangular / 
trilateral one), and therefore sameness in intension, for the overwhelming majority of cases, does go hand in 
hand with sameness in meaning.  
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intension of “Mars” assigns Mars to each possible world in which Mars exists, whether 
it is the fourth planet from the Sun or not in that world. Thus while the singular terms 
“The fourth planet from the Sun” and “Mars” have the same extension, i.e., they 
designate the same object in the actual world, nonetheless they have different 
intensions, i.e., they designate different objects in some possible worlds. Due to this 
sensitivity of intensions to semantic differences, intension is widely considered a 
semantic concept. However, as will be demonstrated below, on top of such semantic 
sensitivity, intensions are no less affected by metaphysical issues, as well as by the 
actual state of the world. The aim of this paper is to clearly demonstrate these 
sensitivities, and to devise a general formula that will enable to calculate the intension 
of referring terms, by considering all relevant factors. More broadly, by analysing the 
modal aspects of our language, we will gain some insight into the nature of the 
interaction between semantics, metaphysics and actuality.  
To achieve this goal, we consider a study case in which we are to determine the 
intension of a new term. To avoid presuppositions regarding the term or its referent, we 
shall set our study case on Mars.   
1.
So we are on yet another philosophical expedition to Mars. Our host colleagues 
introduce us to some purple, jellylike Martian stuff called “T”, and ask us to help them 
to identify T on other possible worlds, to which they frequently travel.2 (Needless to 
say, Mars, as well as Earth, both belong to the actual world). In other words, we are 
asked to determine what would deserve to be called “T”. Or, more technically, we are 
asked to assign to each possible world “T”’s extension, which is just to determine the 
intension of “T”.3 We, of course, are happy to assist. So happy, that we postpone our 
doubts about the possibility of travelling to other possible worlds.
2.
So we start working. Let us define a descriptive term ? in the following manner: ? has 
a sense and ? designates, with respect to every possible world, that which fits this 
sense in that world (if there is such a thing there).4 For example, “The fourth planet 
from the sun”, would be such a descriptive term; it will designate Mars in the actual 
world, but other heavenly bodies in some other possible worlds. “T” may just be such a 
descriptive term. It may, for instance, have the sense ‘jellylike purple stuff’. In such a 
case, the Martian stuff is designated by “T” by virtue of being jellylike purple stuff, and 
                                                          
2 True, the task of reidentification of entities in other possible worlds is at odds with Kripke’s famous 
contention that such identities are stipulated rather than discovered (S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, 46). Although I agree with Kripke that possible worlds can be thus stipulated, I am 
nonetheless not convinced that an alternative, qualitative introduction of possible worlds – i.e., in which no 
such stipulation of identity is involved – is not as permissible.  
3 To avoid confusion: as the Martians know what the actual world is, our mission is to determine the 
intension of “T” on other possible worlds taken as counterfactual, and not as actual. I.e., in Frank Jackson’s 
terminology, we are after the C-intension and not after the A-intension of “T” (F.C. Jackson, From 
Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.) 
4 Note that reference-fixing descriptions do not belong in this category, but rather in the following one.  
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likewise “T” will designate, with respect to every possible world, whatever is jellylike 
purple stuff, in that world. As there may be different stuffs that fit this sense, T on other 
possible worlds may be distinct from the actual Martian referent. (Thus, a descriptive 
“T”, like “the fourth planet from the sun”, need not mark a natural kind.) 
Yet “T” may not be such a term; it may be something like a name – a sort of term 
that we shall call “nondescriptive”, and define in the following way: a nondescriptive 
term ? is designed to designate, with respect to every possible world, the same stuff 
that it designates in the actual world (if such stuff exists in that world).5 For example, 
the name “Mars” is such a nondescriptive term; it names Mars in the actual world and 
thus designates that same object, Mars, in every possible world in which Mars exists. If 
“T” is indeed such a nondescriptive term, then “T” designates, with respect to every 
possible world, just this very same stuff that we were introduced to a short while ago 
on Mars, in that world.6 (Arguably, a nondescriptive “T” includes cases in which “T” is 
a proper name, or an actualised description – like “the actual fourth planet from the 
sun”, or “the actual jellylike purple stuff”, or a demonstrative – like “that fourth planet 
from the sun” or “that jellylike purple stuff”.) 
3.
So if “T” is a nondescriptive term, then in order to identify T on other possible worlds 
we need to be able to tell whether certain stuff that we might encounter on some such 
world is or is not identical to our actual stuff. This may not be so trivial, as some 
possible worlds contain stuffs that are similar to our stuff in certain respects but differ 
from it in other respects, and we need to be qualified to determine whether each stuff is 
or is not identical to ours. Thus before travelling to other possible worlds, we need to 
get a pretty good idea of what this stuff that “T” actually designates on Mars consists 
in. So we go and have a closer examination of that actual referent of “T”. We note its 
manifest properties – that it is purple, jellylike, etc., and upon further examination we 
determine its material constitution to be P. We learn from the Martians that they in fact 
conceive the collection of manifest properties as one property, M. We easily manage to 
adapt and conclude that the actual referent of “T” has the properties P and M. So “T”, if 
nondescriptive, designates, with respect to every possible world, that which is identical 
to this P+M stuff. Evidently, given that the intension of a nondescriptive “T” assigns to 
each possible world “T”’s reference in the actual world, had this actual referent of “T” 
been different from our P+M stuff, the intension of “T” would differ accordingly; it 
would assign to each world the alternative actual referent.  
Now, with respect to these two properties, P and M, there are four kinds of stuff 
that may be found on other possible worlds: 1. Stuff that is P and M (P+M); 2. Stuff 
that although shares the manifest property M has nonetheless a different material 
constitution, say, Q (Q+M); 3. Stuff that has the same material constitution P but a 
different collection of manifest properties, say, N (P+N)7; and, finally, 4. Stuff that is 
                                                          
5 Note that this definition is a description of the semantic function of the term, and not of its content, and 
hence does not make the term a descriptive one; as demonstrated here, such a description of function can be 
provided for Millian names like “Mars”, which are, by definition, not descriptive.  
6 Or its counterpart, if we are persuaded by David Lewis’s view on the nature of cross-worlds relations.  
7 One may object that this option violates physicalism, namely the view according to which the manifest 
supervenes upon the physical and hence no change in the manifest is possible without a change in the 
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neither P nor M, say, some Q and N stuff. (Q+N). Each of these stuffs in fact stands for 
a type of possible worlds; let us tag them w1, w2, w3 and w4 respectively. (We are 
aware, that if there is more than one alternative to P, or more than one alternative to M, 
there will be accordingly more candidates, and thus more types of possible worlds. Our 
list of possible worlds thus might not be exhaustive. This fact, however, need not 
currently worry us, for the argument as it stands by no means depends on a complete 
list of possible worlds). 
4.
For a start, we consider the candidate that has the same material constitution P as the 
actual stuff, but different manifest property, namely, P+N, which is the stuff on w3. Is it 
identical to the actual P+M stuff or not? Being heavily indoctrinated by the 
presuppositions of our Earthean science, we tend to believe that the universe is such 
that it contains various materials, such as P and Q, that merely happen to have their 
manifest properties, like M and N. So it seems that despite the difference in the 
manifest property, the stuff on w3 (P+N), is the same stuff, P, as the actual stuff (P+M); 
so we are naturally drawn to conclude that that stuff is indeed identical to our actual 
referent of “T”. Yet, to our surprise, we soon learn that the Martians have a different 
view on this matter; they take the universe to be such that it contains primarily manifest 
entities, such as M and N, that merely happen to have their material constitution, like P 
or Q. In other words, P+M stuff is primarily the stuff M, that merely happens to have 
the material constitution P, and which might have had another material constitution, 
like, say, Q. Thus on their view, the stuff on w3, having the manifest property N rather 
than M, is in fact distinct from the stuff on actual Mars; it is, rather, the stuff on w2,
Q+M, which is identical to the actual stuff P+M, despite the difference in their material 
constitution.8 What is at stake here is the identity criteria of our Martian entity, the 
P+M stuff, i.e., the identity criteria of “this”, regardless of the way it is described, 
namely, regardless of calling it “stuff” or otherwise.9 And whereas we believe that 
these criteria of identity are primarily material, our hosts believe that these criteria of 
identity are primarily manifest.  
                                                                                                                                            
physical. The stuff on W3, namely, P+N stuff, entails a change, albeit a modal one, in the manifest (from M 
to N) without a change in the physical (P). There are two responses to this. Firstly, physicalism in its 
common versions is restricted to the actual world; it is commonly accepted that, for example, there might
have been “zombies” (same physical state but no mental state), or immaterial souls, yet there actually aren’t 
any. In other words, in some possible worlds, non-physical properties may supervene in a different way on 
physical properties, or, indeed, may not supervene upon them at all (e.g., in worlds with different laws of 
nature). Hence, just as zombies exist in other possible worlds, so does stuff with the same physical property P 
as the actual stuff P+M, but with a different manifest property, N. Secondly, even if we accepted a more 
ambitious version of physicalism that applied to all possible worlds (and thus eliminated this type of possible 
world), still, this would not undermine the general argument here, for we could, in principle, choose some 
stuff with two independent dominant properties, i.e., properties that hold no supervenience relations between 
them. So the objection is not one of essence in this context.  
8 Note that this does not commit the Martians to deny supervenience of the manifest upon the material. For 
such supervenience is consistent with non-material criteria of identity; it seems perfectly consistent to assume 
that the universe is inhabited by, e.g., animals, that merely happen to have the material constitution they have 
(i.e., they might have had different material constitution), and yet at the same time to believe that these 
animals supervene upon their material constitution.  
9 The cost of denying that there are such independent identity criteria is enormous: it is the overall denial of 
intensions of nondescriptive terms, such as “T”, “Mars”, “Alik” etc.  
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After the first mutual puzzlement by our conflicting views, we soon realise how 
dogmatic our beliefs are, and thank the fortunate encounter that allowed us to broaden 
our outlook and to see both options. We both admit, however, that we have no way of 
determining what the universe is really like in this respect, and in particular, what 
“being the same” consists in when applied to the purple jellylike stuff. Indeed, for all 
we know, there may be no fact of the matter here at all.  
Furthermore, we now appreciate that with regard to any property ? of our stuff, it 
is possible, contrary to both what we or the Martians believe, that the universe is such 
that it primarily contains ?s, that merely happen to have other properties, such as their 
material constitution P, and their manifest property M (such a property ? may, for 
instance, be the object’s function). So in principle, there are many more possible 
metaphysical backgrounds.10
Turning back to our job, we so far conclude that the intension of the term “T”, i.e., 
“T”’s reference with respect to different possible worlds, is dependent upon three 
different factors: 1. The semantic rule of “T”, i.e., whether “T” is descriptive or not; 2. 
The actual extension of “T”, i.e., whether it is P+M, or Q+M, or P+N or Q+N; and, 3. 
The metaphysical background of the universe, namely, what count as objects vs. what 
count as properties of objects.  
5.
But what is the intension of the term “T” then? What does in fact deserve to be called 
“T”? Well, surely, to determine the intension of “T” we need the values of each of the 
above three variables. We have already come to suspect that we do not know for sure 
the value of the third variable – the metaphysical background of the world. But as if 
this epistemic worry was not enough, the Martians go on to tell us that they were not 
even sure about the values of the other two variables as well – the semantic rule of “T”, 
and also the true properties of the actual referent. All they are willing to commit to is 
the purple jellylike stuff to which the term “T” actually applies on Mars. Firstly, 
regarding the properties of this actual referent, although their current science told them 
that it had the properties P and M, still, based on their past experience, they were well 
aware of how fallible their science has been, and therefore were careful not to assume 
that it isn’t failing this time as well. And secondly, as to the semantic rule of “T”, some 
of them thought that “T” designated that stuff by virtue of simply naming it, like a 
label; whereas others, by contrast, contended that “T” designated the stuff by virtue of 
that stuff fitting the sense of the term “T”, namely, by having the property M (i.e., 
being jellylike, purple etc.). Furthermore, they thought that other views on this matter 
were also possible. And there was nothing in the actual application of the term on Mars 
to tell them which of the views was right. Pondering about it though, we begin to 
suspect that our epistemic state might not be very different to theirs. 
                                                          
10 There are various metaphysical alternatives in another sense as well. E.g., that the universe contains both
types of objects, namely Ps and Qs as well as Ms and Ns, that simply coincide (on this view, in the case of a 
clay statue, there are two objects, the statue and the lump of clay, in the same place at the same time); or, that 
the universe contains unqualified objects, namely, an unqualified stuff that has the properties P and M, and 
that any further metaphysical burden is entirely theory-relative. However, such alternatives can be 
incorporated in the final analysis, once such an analysis is attained.  
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6.
The problem with this epistemic state is that without the values of the required 
variables, we simply cannot carry out the job. It is just impossible to determine the 
intension of “T” without these data, since different data, i.e., different values of the 
three variables, will result in different intensions. So, what do we do now? Is there a 
way out? Well, of course there is! We could provide the Martians with some well-
defined procedure, which would enable them to calculate the intension of “T” once the 
values of the variables are determined. We could come up with some sort of a formula,
that when filled in with the appropriate data would simply generate the exact intension. 
Indeed, with an appropriate re-interpretation of its variables, such a formula can be 
used to calculate the intension of any term.  
We also appreciate that such a general formula would provide an understanding of 
the general regularity behind individual intensions of specific terms. After all, isn’t it 
what drives great scientist in their pursuit for theories? Admittedly, unlike us, Newton 
had methods for measuring weights, speeds, forces, and other values for the variables 
in his formulas – whereas we, regrettably, do not seem to possess such philosophical 
yardsticks – yet nonetheless, what he was really after was not so much the specific 
outcomes of his formulas, but rather the general rule that would expose the regularity
connecting such values. And in this respect our formula should enjoy the same merit. 
So it now seems that even if we knew beyond any doubt the exact values of the three 
variables, it would still be highly profitable to deliberately put on a “veil of ignorance”, 
and to consider the hypothetical values of each variable, in order to find the general 
formula… Encouraged by these revelations about the importance of a general formula, 
we enthusiastically set for the task. 
7.
To recall, the main values that were considered are the following: 1. The semantic rule: 
may be either descriptive or not; 2. The actual referent: corresponding to our apparent 
P+M actual referent of “T”, the possibilities are that it is: indeed P+M, but also, that it 
may be Q+M, or P+N, or Q+N11; and lastly, 3. The metaphysical background may be 
either a material universe (that happens to have some manifest properties), or a 
manifest universe (that happens to have some material constitution).  
True, we are aware that there are possibilities not covered by the ones mentioned – 
at least as far as the properties of the actual referent and the metaphysical background 
are concerned. For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall construct our formula by 
first considering these options. After arriving at the principle formula, it should be 
fairly straightforward to extend it to encompass the other options as well.  
So apparently the logical space of possibilities here amounts to two (possibilities 
of the semantic rule) times four (possibilities of the actual referent) times two 
(possibilities of the metaphysical background), which is sixteen. Fortunately, the 
                                                          
11 Indeed the last two possibilities are not very probable, since they suggest a different manifest property 
from M, and given that we seem to perceive such properties quite directly we are most likely not to be 
mistaken about them. However, in order for our formula to be general, we would be better off to consider 
those options as well, as it will make the formula applicable to cases in which the M property is not manifest 
and directly perceived, but rather has to be discovered.  
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options are considerably less than that. This is due to the fact that if “T” is descriptive, 
then the values of the other variables play no part in fixing the intension. Such a 
descriptive “T” will simply designate, with respect to every possible world, that which 
fits “T”’s sense (allegedly, ‘being an M’,) in that world – regardless of the 
metaphysical background, or the nature of the actual referent. Thus all eight 
combinations linked with a descriptive semantic rule for “T” collapse into one.  
So overall we have the following nine possible combinations:  
Table 1 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive (Whatever) (Whatever)   
2 Material 
3
P+M
Manifest 
4 Material 
5
Q+M
Manifest 
6 Material 
7
P+N
Manifest 
8 Material 
9
Nondescriptive 
Q+N
Manifest 
All we need to do now is to calculate the intension of “T”, i.e., “T”’s reference 
with respect to the different possible worlds, for each of the nine rows. This is a fairly 
easy task. We shall briefly calculate the intension of the first five rows, from which it 
will be clear how to proceed to fill in the remaining four rows. The completed nine 
rows will be given in a concluding table.  
In row 1, “T” is descriptive. Since, we are told, it is linked with the sense, ‘have 
the (manifest) property M’, it will designate, with respect to each type of possible 
world, that which M’s in that type of world. Hence, the intension of “T” in that case 
would be the following:  
Table 2 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - -
In all subsequent cases, “T” is nondescriptive, and therefore designates, with 
respect to every possible world, that which it designates in the actual world. So we 
need to determine what is the nature of this actual referent of “T”. We can do that on 
the basis of the other two variables: the metaphysical background, and the properties of 
the actual referent. Let us demonstrate this.  
In row 2, “T” designates in the actual world stuff that is P+M (as we actually 
believe it to be the case), and the universe is taken to be a material-universe (similar to 
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what our current science tells us), i.e., the universe is such that it contains, among other 
things, Ps, that happen to have their manifest properties. Hence our actual referent is 
such a P that happens to have the manifest property M. So in that case, “T” will 
designate, with respect to every possible world, that which is P in that world. The 
intension is thus:  
Table 3 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
2 Nondescriptive  P+M Material universe + - + - 
Row 3 is like Row 2, only that now we have a manifest-universe. So in that case, 
the same actual referent, P+M, is in fact an M that merely happens to have the material 
constitution P. Thus “T” will designate, with respect to every possible world, that 
which is M in that world. The intension of “T” in that case is therefore:  
Table 4 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
3 Nondescriptive  P+M Manifest universe + + - - 
In rows 4 and 5, the actual referent is changed, and it is now not P+M but rather 
Q+M. I.e., in this row we consider the option that our actual referent has different 
properties than what we in fact believe it to have. Now if the universe is a material-
universe, then the referent, Q+M, is primarily a Q, that merely happens to have the 
manifest property M. So “T” will designate, with respect to every possible world, that 
which Q’s in that world. If, however, the universe is a manifest-universe, this actual 
referent is an M, and “T” will designate, with respect to every possible world, that 
which M’s in that world:  
Table 5 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
4 Material universe - + - +
5
Nondescriptive  Q+M Manifest universe + + -  - 
Similar considerations will determine the intension for the remaining four rows.  
Overall, we end up with the following complete table, that lists “T”’s intension 
relative to each combination of values of our three variables:  
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Table 6 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)  + + - -
2 Material + - + -
3
P+M
Manifest   + + - -
4 Material - + - +
5
Q+M
Manifest  + + - -
6 Material  +  - + -
7
P+N
Manifest  - -  + +
8 Material - + - +
9
Nondescriptive  
Q+N
Manifest  - -  + +
And so we’re done. Mission complete. Well, at least an outline of our task is 
complete (for our account to be complete we would still need to include more possible 
options for each variable.)  
8.
Finally, we can use our newly devised formula to draw some moral about rigidity.  
A rigid term is defined as one that designates the same referent, and only that 
referent, in all possible worlds in which that referent exists. A nondescriptive term was 
defined as a term that is designed to designate, with respect to every possible world, the 
same referent that it designates in the actual world (if such referent exists in that 
world). Thus it follows that a nondescriptive term is by definition a rigid term. A 
descriptive term, by contrast, carries no such entailment. To recall, a descriptive term 
was defined as a term that is linked with a sense, and that designates, with respect to 
every possible world, that which fits its sense in that term. Thus, a descriptive term 
might be nonrigid, e.g., “the fourth planet from the sun” designates Mars in the actual 
world, Venus in another possible world, etc. Yet a descriptive term might also be a 
rigid term, e.g., “2+2” designates 4 in every possible world, and nothing else; likewise, 
“stuff with atomic number 79” (arguably) designates gold in every possible world in 
which gold exists and nothing else. Thus, whereas nondescriptive terms are by 
definition rigid, descriptive terms may or may not be rigid. In other words, whereas a 
nondescriptive term is rigidified by the very semantic rule that is attached to it, a 
descriptive term is not thus rigidified. In Kripke’s terms, the difference between the 
two kinds of rigidity is that a nondescriptive term is rigid de jure, i.e., by (stipulating a) 
law, whereas a descriptive terms is rigid, when it is rigid, de facto, i.e., as it happens in 
practice (without stipulation).12
Thus all nondescriptive terms are rigid, whereas only some of the descriptive terms 
are rigid. What is it that makes a descriptive term rigid though? Under what 
circumstances would a descriptive term be rigid? A rigid term is one that designates the 
                                                          
12 S. Kripke, 1980, p. 21, n.21
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same referent in all possible worlds, and only that referent. Our intensions formula 
enables us to determine the referent of a term with respect to every possible world; yet 
in order to determine rigidity, we must also know whether these referents are identical 
or not. For instance, the formula entails that the intension of “T” when “T” is 
descriptive (and has the sense “has the property M”) is as follows:  
Table 7 
Semantic rule Actual referent Metaphysical background W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
1 Descriptive  (Whatever)  (Whatever)   + + - -
I.e., the referents of “T” across possible worlds are P+M and Q+M. Yet in order to 
determine whether “T” is rigid or not, we have to further establish whether these 
referents, namely, P+M and Q+M are identical or not. Now this in turn depends on the 
metaphysical background of the universe. The dependence works as follows. If the 
metaphysical background is material, i.e., the universe is such that it primarily contains 
material things like P and Q that merely happen to have manifest properties like M and 
N, then the two stuffs P+M and Q+M, one being P (that happens to have the manifest 
property M) and the other being Q (that happens to have the same manifest property M) 
are in effect distinct. If, by contrast, the metaphysical background is manifest, i.e., the 
universe is such that it primarily contains manifest things like M and N that merely 
happen to have material constitutions like P and Q, then the two stuffs P+M and Q+M, 
being both M, are identical (despite having different contingent material constitutions). 
As a consequence, a material universe will entail that a descriptive “T” (with the sense 
‘being an M’) is nonrigid, whereas a manifest universe will entail that such a 
descriptive “T” is rigid, despite the identical intension in both cases: 
Table 8 
Semantic  
rule 
Actual referent Metaphysical 
background  
W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
Rigidity
1a (Whatever)  Material  + + - - Nonrigid  
1b 
Descriptive (Whatever)  Manifest  + + - - Rigid
It turns out that the same term, with the same descriptive semantic function, may 
come out rigid or nonrigid, depending on the metaphysical background. Rigidity is thus 
not an exclusively semantic concept; it is no less a metaphysical concept. 
To generalise, what makes a descriptive term like “T” rigid, is that its sense – in 
our case “being an M” – is linked with a kind of things (as opposed to a kind of 
properties of things), since such metaphysical background guarantees that all that fits 
that sense is the same stuff. Whereas when the sense is linked with a kind of a property 
of things rather than with a kind of things – in our case, when M is considered a kind of 
a property of things rather than a kind of things – then the term turns out nonrigid, 
since there are different kinds of things that would fit this sense.  
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Given that all options in which “T” is nondescriptive make “T” rigid, it follows 
that there is but a single case in which “T” is rendered nonrigid. This happens only 
when “T” is descriptive and its sense is linked with a kind of a property of things, 
rather than with a kind of things. In all other cases, “T” comes out rigid:  
Table 9 
Semantic  
rule 
Actual referent Metaphysical 
background  
W1
P+M
W2
Q+M
W3
P+N
W4
Q+N
Rigidity
1a (Whatever) Material + + - - Nonrigid
1b 
Descriptive
(Whatever)  Manifest + + - -
Rigid
De facto
2 Material + - + -
3
P+M
Manifest   + + - -
4 Material - + - +
5
Q+M
Manifest  + + - -
6 Material  +  - + -
7
P+N
Manifest  - -  + +
8 Material - + - +
9
Non- 
descriptive  
Q+N
Manifest  - -  + +
Rigid
De jure 
Conclusion  
We were looking for the intension of “T”, i.e., the reference of “T” with respect to 
different possible worlds, or simply, what would deserve to be called “T”. We have 
found the three factors upon which intensions depend. We have further considered 
possible values for each of these variables. We have listed the different possible 
combination of these values. Finally, we have calculated the resultant intension for 
each such combination. Thus, using the corresponding values with regard to the term 
“T”, our Martian colleagues can now determine the intension of “T”. In fact, they can 
do more than that. By reinterpreting “P”, “M”, “Q” and “N”, our hosts are now in a 
position to determine the intension of any term, since the intensions given in the above 
table remain fixed. Finally, they can also appreciate the common general rule 
underlying all such intensions.    
And, frankly, so can we.13
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